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DIFFERENT ANTISEMITISMS:  
ON THREE DISTINCT FORMS OF ANTISEMITISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 
– WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON SWEDEN 
 
 




This article studies eight European countries, investigating how the level of antisemitism as 
registered in national populations relates to the perception of antisemitism by the Jewish 
population in the same country. Furthermore, the article empirically identifies distinct aspects 
of antisemitism, deconstructing the concept of antisemitism and breaking it up into three 
kinds of empirically differently based and composed antisemitisms (Note the plural!): classic 
antisemitism, Israel-derived antisemitism and Enlightenment-based antisemitism. The article 
also elaborates on some more general implications for the understanding of the character of 
antisemitism in contemporary Europe, and based on that, presents some perspectives on the 
development of the three distinct antisemitisms in contemporary Europe.
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1
 In other words, the purpose is not merely to outline the level of antisemitism, either registered in the general 
population or as perceived by the Jewish population. If that were the case, its results could be called into 
question for being obsolete, since several serious antisemitic attacks have occurred after the empirical data for 
the article were collected. Among these attacks are the so-called Charlie Hebdo and Super Casher terrorist 
attacks in Paris January 2015, the murder of a Jewish guard outside the synagogue of Copenhagen a month later 
as well as before the major terrorist attacks in central Paris the evening of November 13 2015 and in Brussels on 
March 23 2016. It goes without saying that these events have most likely heavily influenced both attitudes and 
perceptions of antisemitism on the European scene. 
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The countries included in the article are Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, but a special focus is placed on Sweden
2
 because 
the situation in Sweden concerning antisemitism and the Jewish population’s reactions to 
perceived antisemitism is particularly illustrative of some of the main points we can make 
based on our investigations. 
 
 
The two survey studies 
In this article, we combine and compare results from two major, but differently focused cross-
national surveys on antisemitism. On the one hand, we have data from the European Union 
Agency For Fundamental Rights’ (FRA) survey of Jews’ perceptions and experiences of 
antisemitism in eight EU-member states – Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Sweden and United Kingdom.
3
 This survey was carried out in the second half of 2012.  
On the other hand, we use the results from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) survey 
of attitudes towards Jews, with representative samples of each country's population, carried 
out at the end of 2013. This study covers 102 countries all over the world.
4
 In this article we 
will focus only on the same eight EU-countries that were included in the FRA study.
5
 
In July 2013 – February 2014, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) carried out a survey of 
attitudes toward Jews with representative samples in 102 countries around the world. The 
respondents were presented with the following eleven propositions about Jews and asked to 
indicate whether they find the suggested proposition “probably true” or “probably false.” 
 
1. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [the country they live in].  
2. Jews have too much power in the business world.  
3. Jews have too much power in international financial markets 
4. Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind 
5. Jews have too much control over global affairs. 
6. People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave. 
7. Jews think they are better than other people. 
                                                        
2
 Both of the present authors are Swedes. Lars Dencik was part of the international research team that designed 
and carried out the FRA-survey, and also responsible for the study in Sweden. 
3
 FRA – European Union for Fundamental Rights. (2013). Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU 
Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Vienna: FRA. 
4
 ADL – Anti-Defamation League. (2014). ADL Global 100. An Index Anti-Semitism. http://global100.adl.org. 
5
 The countries were selected by FRA among EU member states. Originally 9 countries were selected for a web-
based survey among Jewish residents in the respective countries. Romania however had to be excluded from the 
analysis because data from there were too weak for statistical analysis. 
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8. Jews have too much control over the United States government. 
9. Jews have too much control over the global media. 
10. Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust. 
11. Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars. 
 
An index was constructed implying that respondents who answered that at least 6 out of the 
11 statements are “probably true” are defined to harbour antisemitic attitudes.  
It should be noted that we find the criteria according to the ADL-survey for judging a 
respondent as antisemitic to be quite crude. On the one hand, you may of course be 
antisemitic even if you just find 5 or even one of the statements being probably true, and on 
the other hand, there might be other reasons than antisemitism than to find it “probably true” 
that, e.g. “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”  
We also note that at least nine of the eleven items the respondents are asked to take a 
stand on are part of what could be labelled classic antisemitic stereotypes.  
In any case, results of the ADL-survey give some kind of indication on how the general 
population in a given country regards Jews. According to the index used, the level of 
antisemitism in each of eight European countries we are studying is distributed as in Figure 1: 
 
As can be seen, Hungary and France harbour the largest segment of what in the sequel will be 
labelled classic antisemites, whereas UK and Sweden have the smallest relative number of 
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this kind of antisemites. In fact, Sweden ranks number 100 out of the 102 investigated 
countries all over the world – only in Laos and the Philippines are there smaller proportions of 
the population in the country harbouring classic antisemitic stereotypes than in Sweden, 
according to this ADL-survey. 
Unlike the ADL-survey, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ (FRA) 
survey is directed exclusively to persons in eight EU-member states who regard themselves 
being in some sense Jewish. Those who do are asked several different questions about their 
experiences of antisemitism in their country of residence and about how they as Jews perceive 
antisemitism.  
On the question of how big a problem they consider antisemitism to be in their country 
of residence, these Jewish respondents answered as shown in Figure 2: 
 
We can note that more than ¾ of the Jews in three of the countries, Hungary, France and 
Belgium, find antisemitism in their country to be a big or a fairly big problem. The Jews in 
UK and Latvia do so to a lesser extent. It is, however, noteworthy that as many as 20% of the 
Jewish respondents in Sweden perceive antisemitism to be a very big problem.  
In this context, we should bear in mind that the city of Malmö, the third largest Swedish 
city, harbouring one of Sweden’s three Jewish communities, has become infamous worldwide 
for an extraordinary number of antisemitic incidents in the years preceding the present study. 
In further analysis, we have found that the perception of antisemitism as a very big problem in 
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Sweden is, to a great extent, due to what has occurred in Malmö, where approximately 4% of 
the Jewish respondents in Sweden reside. 
 
Attitudes of antisemitism vs the perception of antisemitism  
Is there a correspondence between the Jews’ experiences and perceptions of antisemitism and 
the proportion of antisemites in the population of the country where they live? 
Comparing the two measures we have presented so far, viz. the level of (classic) 
antisemitism in the general population and the degree to which the Jews in the same country 
perceive antisemitism as a problem in their country, we achieve the picture presented in 
Figure 3: 
 
Most remarkable in this picture are the large discrepancies in the UK and Sweden, between 
the proportion of the population harbouring classic antisemitic attitudes and the Jews’ 
perception of antisemitism as a problem in the country.  In the two most antisemitic countries, 
according to the ADL-measure, Hungary and France, the Jews perceive antisemitism as a 
problem by about factor 2 as compared to the level of antisemitism registered in the general 
population of the country, whereas the Jews in UK do so by approximately factor 6 and the 
Jews in Sweden, the country harbouring the smallest amount of classic antisemites, do so by 






Based on this, we ask: if the presence of classic antisemitic stereotypes is not what alerts the 
Jews in Sweden to find antisemitism to be a problem in their country, are the Jews there and 
in the UK, just more sensitive or paranoid about antisemitism? Or are there other elements, 
not measured by the ADL-index, that Jews associate with the presence of antisemitism in 
these societies?  
To find out about that, we ask whether there are any differences in the extent to which 
the Jews of the countries have heard a non-Jewish person in the country utter what they 
perceive as an antisemitic comment? If there are no significant differences between the 
countries in this respect, this might indicate that there are statements other than the classic 
antisemitic ones that are perceived as “antisemitism” by the Jews in the country. Figure 5 is a 
picture of the percentage of Jewish respondents in the eight investigated countries who 











It is noteworthy here that a vast majority in all of the eight countries, more than 9 out of ten of 
the Jewish respondents, have heard an antisemitic comment within the last 12 month. This is 
true also for Sweden and the UK, even if the figure in these two countries is slightly lower 
than in the other countries. The slight difference between the eight countries with respect to 
having heard an antisemitic comment is, however, very far from the vast difference between 
the UK and Sweden on the one hand, and the other countries investigated in this study on the 
other, when it comes to the proportion of antisemites in the country (cf. Figure 1). There are 
two possible reasons for this: the criteria for qualifying as an “antisemite” according to the 
ADL-survey is to agree to at least six of the eleven statements listed above. Thus, the criteria 
overshadows the fact that people who score below that level, e.g. by agreeing to five or four 
of the eleven statements may also have uttered this, and hence caused the Jews around them 
to hear an antisemitic statement. 
Another, and in a way more challenging, reason is that something other than classic 
antisemitism can also be perceived as antisemitism by the Jews in the eight countries. This 









We have noted remarkable discrepancies between the registered level of classic antisemitism 
in the general population and the degree to which Jews in the same country perceive or 
experience ”something antisemitic”. 
Are there also similar discrepancies between particular antisemitic attitudes in the 
general population and the degree to which the Jews of the country have actually been 
confronted with such attitudes?   
We will investigate this by scrutinizing the relation between the registered frequency in 
the population of some of the singular components of classic antisemitism and the degree to 
which the Jews in the country report that they have actually experienced them. 
Thus, we compare how often a Jew has heard that “Jews have too much power in the country” 
with the degree to which people in the general population of the country find such a statement 












The most striking element of this picture is the discrepancy when it comes to Sweden and the 
UK between the degree to which this stereotype is present in the population, on the one hand, 
and on the other, how often the Jews in the country have heard someone utter such a 
statement. 
The same tendency also appears when it comes to the proposition that “Jews exploit 
Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.” 
Comparing how often a Jew has heard that “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their 
own purposes” with the degree to which people in the general population of the country find it 
“probably true” that “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust” 














Again we can notice a striking discrepancy with respect to the two columns when it comes to 
Sweden and the UK. 
One might suspect that there is a consistent pattern with respect to this. To find out 
about that, we examine one of the classic antisemitic items, viz. that “Jews are responsible for 




Comparing the Jews’ subjective perceptions with the measure of the frequency of people in 
the general population in the respective countries who think it is probably true that ”Jews 
have too much power in the business world”, the same pattern of discrepancy emerges, albeit 
less drastically. In this connection, we may also note that there is a correlation between the 
extent to which the general population in a country harbours the viewpoint that, ”Jews have 
too much power in the business world” and the proportion of Jews in the country who have 
heard that “Jews are responsible for the current economic crises”. And again Sweden diverges 
from this general pattern by a somewhat larger discrepancy between the two measures, mainly 
consisting of a considerably lower presence of this stereotype in their population (9%). Still, 4 
out of 10 among Jews in Sweden claim to have come across such an attitude within the last 12 
months. 
Do Jews in Sweden consistently confront antisemitic statements to a lesser extent than 
Jews in other European countries? With respect to the suggestion that “the Holocaust is a 
myth” – it seems so. See Figure 10: 
 
This also holds true when it comes to the proposition that “the interests of Jews in our country 









And even more so when the suggestion is that “Jews are not capable of integration into your 
society". See Figure 12: 
 
What may explain this pattern? In order to find out, we need to investigate to what degree the 
Jews in the respective countries feel that they belong to the country they live in.  
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In doing so we find an opposite pattern to what we have found so far. Jews in Sweden, 
the UK and France, feel strong ties to the country they live in, whereas Jews in Germany and 
Latvia do so to a much lesser extent. The last observation is readily explainable by the fact 
that a large number of Jews in these two countries, Germany and Latvia, are fairly recent 
immigrants from Russia. But in Sweden, many of the Jews living there are Holocaust or post-
Holocaust immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and Sweden is actually the only 
European country where there are considerably more Jews today than before the Holocaust. 
How is it that Jews in Sweden feel stronger ties to the country they live in than Jews in any of 
the other European countries? 
When we take into account whether the respondents were born in the country they live 
in. the picture becomes even clearer. These relations are shown in Figure 13: 
 
Almost 1/3 of the Jewish respondents in Sweden were not born in the country; still, almost 
85% of them say they feel that a strong sense of belonging to the country. The same holds for 
France. There are, however, differing backgrounds for the immigrated Jews’ sense of 
belonging to France and Sweden respectively. The majority of Jewish immigrants to France 
come from the former French colonies in French-speaking Maghreb. Most of them had 
already identified as “French” while they were there, which of course facilitated their feeling 
of belonging to France when actually moving there. The Swedish case is radically different. 
Most Jewish immigrants to Sweden come from Eastern and Central Europe, they didn’t speak 
Swedish and had no previous identification with anything Swedish. Many were survivors of 
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the Holocaust; others came a little later from communist-dominated Eastern and Central 
European countries. To many in both of these groups, being accepted and being given living 
opportunities in the well-developed Swedish welfare state became somewhat like having 
landed in the Promised Land. Many of them did well in Sweden and approved of identifying 
as Swedes. 
In Hungary the relation is reversed: there, almost all the Jews, 95% of them, were born 
in the country, but only a little over 70% feel they belong to the country. Latvia is also a 
special case – while over 70% of the Jews there were born in the country, only 40% of them 
feel they belong to contemporary Latvia. 
If people do not feel they belong to their country of residence, it may depend on their 
being in some sense regarded as “strangers” by the other inhabitants of the country. By 
combining three measures, viz. the extent to which people in the country hold the opinion that 
“Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in”, that “The interests of the Jews 
are very different from the interests in the rest of the population” and that “Jews are not 
capable of integration into the country” we may achieve a picture of the degree to which Jews 
are perceived as strangers in the country they live in. The picture looks like in Figure 14:  
 
We note that Hungary and Sweden are radical opposites in this respect. On all of the three 
measures we have included as indicators of “strangeness” – whether Jews are seen as capable 
of integration into the country, whether they are regarded as having different interests than the 
general population of the country, and whether they are more loyal to Israel than to the 
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country they live in – the population in Hungary scores higher than in any of the other 
European countries, and on all of them the population in Sweden scores lower than in any of 
the other countries. Thus in Hungary, where almost all Jews living there were born there, 
Jews are still seen as “strangers” by approximately 2/3 of the population, whereas in Sweden, 
where a large portion of the Jews are immigrants or children of immigrants, the Jews are 
regarded as a “strange” element in the Swedish society by “only” around ¼ of the Swedish 
population. 
In this connection we may also note a correlation implying that in countries where less 
of the population holds the view that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they 
live in, the Jews living there feel a stronger sense of belonging.  
 
Harassment and fear 
Jewish respondents in the countries were also asked whether, in the last 12 months, they 
personally have been verbally insulted or harassed, or been physically attacked because they 
are Jewish. 
As shown in Figure 15, we surprisingly found that more Jews in Sweden and France, 
than in any other of the investigated European countries, claim to have been physically 





As displayed in Figure 16 this picture also holds when we ask these Jewish respondents 
whether they personally have witnessed anyone being attacked physically or verbally because 
he/she is Jewish: 
 
These findings are remarkable in light of the fact that Sweden and France are among the 
countries where Jews have a stronger sense of belonging than in other countries (cf. Figure 
13).  
How is it that there is a seemingly positive correlation between the Jews’ feeling of 
belonging to the country and experiences of physical attacks on Jews? One possible reason 
might be that although they are relatively well integrated in society, they are still regarded by 
some as a rather alien element in society, which is perceived as an ambiguity among those 
who seek “clarity” and “pure lines”. The phenomenon of “intolerance of ambiguity” is well 
known in social psychology
6
 and it has been scientifically established that the perception of 
ambiguity triggers aggression among those for whom it is too much of a psychological 
challenge to harbour ambiguities.
7
 The fact that a majority of Jews in Germany were well 
integrated, not to say even assimilated, into the German society up to the Nazi 
                                                        
6
 Fraenkel-Brunswick, E. (1948). Intolerance of ambiguity as an emotional and perceptual personality variable, 
in Journal of Personality, 18, pp. 108-123 and Furnham, A. & Marks, J. (2013). Tolerance of Ambiguity: A 
Review of the Recent Literature, in Psychology Vol.4, No.9, pp. 717-728. 
7
 Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. 
New York: Harper and Row and Stone, W. F., Lederer, G., & Christie, R. (1993). Strengths and Weaknesses: 
The Authoritarian Personality Today. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
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Machtübernahme in 1933 did, as we know, not prevent them from being targets of harassment 
at first, and then extermination. Perhaps rather the opposite is true. 
A relevant question, following the observation that Jews, particularly in Sweden and 
France, are attacked because they are Jews, is how this impacts them mentally? Will they be 
afraid? Will they manifest that fear by, for instance, hiding the fact that they are Jewish? And 
perhaps also by avoiding visiting Jewish sites more than Jews do in the other investigated 
countries? 
We asked the Jewish respondents in the investigated countries if they ever avoid 
wearing, carrying or displaying items in public that might help people recognize them as 
Jews? The extent to which Jews in the eight countries do so is presented in Figure 17: 
 
Corresponding with the findings concerning experience of physical attacks, we find that 
particularly in Sweden and France, more Jews avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things 
that might help people recognize them as Jews in public than in the other countries.  
We also asked the Jewish respondents “How often do you avoid visiting Jewish events 
or sites because you do not feel safe as a Jew there, or on the way there?” The answers are 









Not surprisingly, the response pattern to this question is quite similar to the way Jews in the 
different countries replied to the question about hiding their Jewish symbols in public, also 
corresponding approximately to the degree of physical attacks on Jews in the respective 
countries. 
 
Assimilation and integration 
In this context we should also note that Jews in the UK, where, like Sweden and France, Jews 
also feel that they strongly belong, display a completely different pattern when it comes to 
manifesting fear. 
Striking is the contrasting pattern between Sweden and the UK. The Swedish data 
suggest that Swedish Jews both feel that they belong to their country of residence more than 
Jews do in any of the investigated countries – and still avoid displaying their Jewish identity 
more than Jews do in any of the other countries.  
The Jews in the UK also feel that they strongly belong to the country they live in, 
almost to the same extent as the Jews in Sweden. But in contrast to Jews in Sweden, they do 
not avoid wearing things that might help people recognize them as Jews, nor do they avoid 
visiting Jewish sites and events because they do not feel safe as Jews there. At the same time, 
they report having been physically attacked or having witnessed others being physically 
attacked because of their Jewishness to a lesser extent than in most of the other countries in 
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Europe. Why these differences? Perhaps an explanation can be found in the fact that Sweden 
until quite recently has been, culturally and religiously, a very homogeneous society, whereas 
the UK has long been a multicultural society where different minorities live in accordance 
with their own customs and traditions. 
The different patterns concerning Jews in Sweden and the UK might be interpreted as 
expressions of assimilation, as opposed to integration. The Swedish data convey a picture that 
indicates that Jews in Sweden are subjected to a situation that triggers assimilation, whereas 
the British data show a picture that might be interpreted as indicating that the Jewish 
population there benefits from a condition that allows for integration.  
 
The impact of the Israel – Arab conflict: Israel-derived antisemitism. 
A puzzling question is the high level of avoiding displaying one’s Jewish identity among Jews 
in Sweden, where classic antisemitic attitudes are almost absent in the general population, as 
compared to the relatively lower level of avoidance in Hungary, where antisemitic stereotypes 
are much more frequent than anywhere else in the investigated EU-countries.  
If the prevalence of classic antisemitic attitudes in the population cannot account for 
these differences, then one needs to ask what else could explain it? Could it for instance have 
anything to do with the impact of the Israel-Arab conflict in their respective countries? Thus 
we ask our Jewish respondents to what extent the Israeli-Arab conflict impacts on how safe 






























Besides noting that Jews’ sense of security is affected by the Israeli-Arab conflict in Belgium 
and France to a considerably larger extent than in the other countries, we should note that 
more than 1/3 of the Jewish respondents in Sweden state that the Israeli-Arab conflict affects 
their sense of security “a great deal” – the third highest level after Belgium and France – 
whereas the figure in Hungary is considerably lower, just over 12%. 
As shown below in Figure 20 this discrepancy becomes even more marked when we 
focus on the tendency to blame Jews in European countries for anything done by the Israeli 
government. 
In this context, the relatively recent concept ”New antisemitism” comes to mind. This is 
a concept that attempts to capture a new form of antisemitism that has developed in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. This kind of "new antisemitism” manifests itself mainly as 
opposition to Zionism and the State of Israel. The concept generally posits that much of what 
purports to be criticism of Israel by various individuals and groups, is, in fact, tantamount to 
demonization of the State of Israel, and that results in attacks on Jews and Jewish symbols 
outside ”the Jewish state” as well. 
Several concerned Jewish scholars and intellectuals have criticized the concept, arguing 
that it conflates anti-Zionism with antisemitism, defines legitimate criticism of Israel too 
narrowly and demonization too broadly, trivializes the meaning of antisemitism, and exploits 
antisemitism in order to silence political debate about Israeli actions and policies.
8
 
Although, as we have just demonstrated, many Jews in Europe are, as a matter of fact, 
often blamed for “anything done by the Israeli government” we share the critique of the 
concept of “new antisemitism”. It is too broad-based, its connotations are too wide and it 
comprises too much to be useful for our purpose. To capture the phenomenon we have 
actually observed, i.e. that Jews in Europe are attacked, verbally or physically, just because 
they are Jews, because of what those who attack them perceive the state of Israel is or does, 
we need a more precise concept – a concept that does not include criticism of Israel or of 
Zionism as such.  
We will call this particular kind of antisemitism Israel-derived antisemitism.  
 
 
                                                        
8
 Klug, B. (2004). The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism, in The Nation, February, Klug, B. (2012). Interrogating 
“New Anti-Semitism”, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, October, Lerner, M. (2007). There Is No New Anti-






In this context, we notice that in no country do the Jews feel that they are blamed “all the 
time” for anything done by the Israeli government as frequently as in Sweden, and in no 
country is the corresponding figure as low as in Hungary (except for Latvia – a special case in 
this study anyway). 
This might indicate that there are different sources for what is perceived as 
“antisemitism” in the different countries, e.g. Sweden and Hungary. Now, if what is perceived 
as manifestations of antisemitism differs, this may also trigger different reactions to such 
manifestations. What may seem surprising from one understanding of antisemitism may well 
be adequate as a reaction to other manifestations of other kinds of antisemitism. 
For instance, Jews differ to some degree, between the countries, when the question is to 
what extent they find it antisemitic to criticize Israel.  
Figure 21 demonstrates that again it is Sweden that also differs in this respect from the 
other countries. Jews in Sweden consider it definitively antisemitic if a non-Jew criticizes 









Even when the question concerns support of boycotts of Israeli goods and products, the 
picture as shown in Figure 22 remains stable. Actually, a majority of Jews in all countries 
would regard a non-Jew suggesting boycott of Israeli goods to be antisemitic, but Jews in 





One may wonder why this is so? Could it be that Jews in Sweden are more able than Jews in 
the other countries to distinguish anti-Zionism from antisemitism? Or is it that Jews in 
Sweden have internalized the rather hegemonic and frequently voiced anti-Zionist and also 
anti-Israeli public discourse in their country more than Jews in the other countries? Sweden is 
so far (2016) the only one of the eight countries that has officially acknowledged Palestine as 
a state; the present Swedish Foreign minister representing the Social Democratic Party, 
Margot Wallström, has also publically accused Israel of carrying out extra-legal executions of 
Palestinians, etc.  
In any case, there is no doubt that, regardless of their individual stand on Israel, the 
sense of security and degree of acceptance the Jews feel they have in all of the eight European 
countries involved in this study, is to a considerable degree affected by events in and around 
Israel and by the national and international reactions to these events.  
 
“Aufklärungsantisemitismus” 
Whatever the reason that Jews in Sweden diverge from the way Jews in other  European 
countries regard critique of Israel, this is not the only aspect of more or less anti-Jewish 
discourse in which the situation in Sweden differs from the general picture in Europe. 
Figure 23 illustrates that proposals to prohibit core Jewish traditions and practices such 
as brit mila (circumcision of new-born baby boys) and shechita (slaughtering of animals 
according to religious prescriptions) are more often heard in Sweden, the most modernized 
and secularized country in this study (and perhaps in the world), than in any other country. 
Interestingly, in Hungary, the country in the study with the largest proportion of citizens 
holding classic antisemitic attitudes, these kinds of anti-Jewish suggestions are much less 















Critique of core Jewish practices such as circumcision of baby boys and slaughtering of 
animals according to certain religious prescriptions is not necessarily based in antisemitic 
sentiments. Jewish persons may, however, based on their historical experiences of previous 
antisemitic campaigns and sense of cultural vulnerability in the society they live in, perceive 
it as such. In the contemporary world some of this kind of critique of significant Jewish 
customs appears to be based on modern ideas of children’s rights and concern for the welfare 
of animals. The French-Italian historian Diana Pinto has labelled this form of anti-Jewish 
attitudes and critique Aufklärungsantisemitismus, i.e. a basically an Enlightenment-based 
critique of traditional Jewish practices. As shown in Figure 24, this Enlightenment inspired 
attitude is most pronounced and frequent in the most clearly Protestant, modernized and 
secularized countries of this study: Sweden, Germany and the UK. Those who present such 
viewpoints are often people with liberal political viewpoints. Liberals are usually among 
those who most consistently defend the idea of religious freedom. In this instance, that idea 
comes in conflict with another idea, central to the liberal ideology: the individual’s right to 
decide for himself and is also reinforced also by the equally liberally inspired idea of 
children’s rights. For some liberals, such as Bengt Westerberg, former leader of the Liberal 
Party and Minister of Social Affairs in Sweden, the aforementioned viewpoints apparently 
carry more weight than the idea of religious freedom. For other liberals the reverse is true.  
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Whether or not this kind of anti-Jewish position, voiced from the standpoint of 
Enlightenment, attacking customs like brit mila and/or shechita should, in fact, be considered 
another kind of antisemitism, remains to be discussed. In relation to this, it might be relevant 
to reflect on possible differences in the driving forces behind the critique of traditional Jewish 
customs and classic antisemitic attitudes. And, for that matter, whether attacks on Jews in 
European countries, based on perceptions of the policies and actions of the state of Israel, 
have different driving forces than the other two sets of attitudes noted here. There might also 
be interesting and perhaps significant differences with respect to what kind of persons, 
socially, politically, intellectually and culturally, hold these different kinds of anti-Jewish 
sentiments. We will return to this question in the conclusion.  
 
Perpetrators of antisemitic comments/attacks 
What we have identified as classic antisemitic prejudices are, as shown in Figure 24 below, 
heard more frequently by Jews in Hungary than by Jews anywhere else in Europe. Statements 
of this kind are relatively rarely heard in the UK, less than in the other investigated countries. 
Jews in Sweden are confronted by such ideas to a slightly lesser degree than Jews in general 
in continental Europe.  
Figure 24: 
 
We asked our Jewish respondents how they would describe the person or group that made the 
antisemitic comments/attacks they had been witnessing. In this connection, it should be 
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emphasized that we do not know exactly what the respondents refer to when answering that 
question. It is the respondent’s subjective opinion of what constitutes antisemitism that counts 
in this context.  
What Jews in the different countries have perceived as an antisemitic comment/attack, 
may be attributed to different groups. We asked our respondents to describe the person or 
group that made the antisemitic comment or act they had recently experienced. The 
respondents were asked to categorize the alleged perpetrator into one of the following four 
groups: 
 A person with right-wing political views. 
 A person with left-wing political views. 
 A person with Muslim views. 
 A person with Christian views. 
 
In Figure 25 we see that Jews in Hungary, where the classic form of antisemitism is most 
predominant, mainly find the antisemitic attackers to be political right-wingers. This is also, 
but to a lesser extent, true for Italy, but much less so in the other investigated countries, and 
least of all in Sweden and France: 
 
 
Correspondingly, Jews in Hungary, to a considerably lesser extent than Jews in the other 
countries, attribute the antisemitic remarks to perpetrators from the left-wing of the political 
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spectrum. In contrast, as shown in Figure 26, a majority of Jews in France, Italy and Belgium 
feel that the antisemitic comments they have experienced were carried out by persons with 
left-wing political views: 
 
The balance/ratio between supposedly left-wing and right-wing perpetrators naturally differ 
sharply between Hungary and France. Figure 27 demonstrates that their patterns are in fact 
almost opposite. Interestingly, the left-wing/right-wing ratio is almost equal in Sweden and 
the UK – and many other response patterns resemble each other most closely in these two 
countries. In both countries, the Jewish respondents attribute almost 60% more of antisemitic 
















In the on-going public debate, “Muslims” are often targeted as perpetrators of terrorist 
attacks. In many cases such attacks are openly motivated by something that has to do with 
Israel and actions taken by the Israeli state. Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 28 below, we 
see that many Jews, particularly in France and Belgium, where some major events of this type 
took  place shortly before our survey, attributed the antisemitic attacks to Muslims. To a 
lesser extent, this is also the case in the UK and Sweden (again on almost the same level). On 
7 July 2005, some years before our study, a large-scale terrorist attack carried out by Muslim 
activists took place in London. On 11 December 2010 a failed terrorist attempt, including 
heavy bombs, took place in central Stockholm. The perpetrator was a Muslim activist who 
blew himself up, but miraculously did not succeed in killing anyone else. It is understandable 
that such major events may colour the perceptions of the Jewish population in these countries. 
Closer analysis shows that the Swedish figure also relates to more recent events in the city of 
Malmö – a relatively small city with only a tiny Jewish community, but with a relatively large 
proportion of Muslims originating from the Middle East. Malmö has become infamous for 
continuous harassment of Jews in the city, and for the (by now) former mayor’s expressions 








If Muslims may be viewed as perpetrators of antisemitic comments based on their disgust for 
Israel and its policies, Jews might perceive Christians as the source for another kind of 
religiously inspired anti-Jewish critique. To some extent this seems to be the case. As shown 
in Figure 29 we find that a considerable percentage of what are perceived as antisemitic 
comments are attributed to people with a Christian point of view in Italy and Hungary, the 
two most outspokenly Catholic countries included in this study. In radically modernized and 

















So far we have dealt with people who Jewish respondents identify as those who utter the 
antisemitic comments they hear or read about. A different, but related question is who they 
perceive to be the perpetrator(s) of physical attacks or threats they have experienced because 
they are Jewish. We asked those in our sample who indicated that they had experienced 
physical attacks or threats in the preceding five years
9
: Thinking about the incident where 
somebody attacked or threatened you in a way that frightened you because you are Jewish – 
who did this to you? The respondents were given an opportunity to choose between several 
different kinds of possible perpetrators, among them members of one of the four groups we 
discussed above, viz. someone with right-wing or left-wing political view, as well as someone 
with Christian or Muslim extremist views.
10
 The result is shown below in Figure 30: 
 
 
                                                        
9
 The number of respondents who reported to have been victims of such attacks was around 7%. The number of 
persons in Latvia who reported such experiences was too few to constitute a base for statistical description. 
10
 The list of options to choose from read like this: 1.Family/household member; 2.Neighbour; 3.Colleague, boss 
or supervisor at work; 4.Someone from school, college or university; 5.A customer, client or patient; 6.Someone 
with a right-wing political view; 7.Someone with a left-wing political view; 8.Teenager or group of teenagers; 
9.Doctor, healthcare worker; 10.Police officer or border guard; 11.Public official (e.g. a civil servant); 12.Private 
security guard; 13.Someone with a Christian extremist view; 14.Someone with a Muslim extremist view; 
15.Someone else (specify); Don’t know. 
Approximately 50% of those who identified someone as a perpetrator identified this person or group to belong to 






In all of the participating countries, except for Hungary and Italy, the perpetrators of 
threatening antisemitic physical attacks are mostly identified as persons or groups with 
Muslim extremist views. In Hungary the group most frequently associated with antisemitic 
violence is the right-wing activists, and in Italy both right-wing and left-wing activists are 
seen more often as perpetrators of antisemitic violence than are Muslim extremists. However 
it should also be noted that in all the other countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, UK 
and not least Sweden, persons with Muslim extremist views
11
 are seen as perpetrators of 
antisemitic violence much more than any other of the groups we focused on. 
In this connection, it is also interesting to note the discrepancy between those who are 
identified as uttering antisemitic comments and those who are identified as perpetrators of 
physical antisemitic violence and threats. Yet, while when it comes to antisemitic comments, 
two of the four groups we study here, viz. the group of people with left-wing views and the 
group of people with Muslim extremist views are “blamed” for being the source of such 
                                                        
11
 Whether the person identified as such is in fact a Muslim extremist we cannot know. 
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comments to more or less the same degree
12
, this is far from so when the issue is physical 
violence and threats. On the contrary, physical attacks and threats are much more often 
attributed to those with Muslim extremist views than to any of the other groups we have 
discussed here. Hence, even if such attacks and threats do not occur frequently, the fact that 
such acts, if and when they occur, are perceived as caused by Muslim extremists, might 
constitute a much higher level of fear among Jews in areas where people with Muslim 
extremist views live (such as e.g. the city of Malmö in Sweden), than in areas where 
antisemitic comments are ubiquitous but where no significant number of people with Muslim 
extremist views live (such as in Hungary). 
In this context a note of caution is warranted: What has been registered by the FRA-
study is who are perceived as the persons/groups who have uttered the antisemitic comment 
and/or launched the antisemitic attack or threat the responding Jews have experienced. 
Perceptions are often coloured both by rumours circulating in the public debate and by the 
respondents' own stereotypes and prejudices. Nevertheless, these perceptions might of course 
still be accurate and regardless of whether they are or not, they constitute a significant 
sociological fact in and of themselves. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our study has led us to distinguish between three different kinds of antisemitism.  
 One of them is based on classic antisemitic stereotypes. We refer to this as Classic 
antisemitism. There is a clear racist component in this kind of antisemitism, and also a 
strong element of conspiratorial thinking. 
 Another of these antisemitisms consists of accusations and attacks on Jews because 
they are Jews, referring to Israel and actions taken by the Israeli state. There is a 
strong political component in this kind of antisemitism, and a certain degree of 
conspiratorial thinking is also involved here. We have labelled this kind of 
antisemitism Israel-derived antisemitism. 
 A third kind of what might be perceived as antisemitism is the critique of core Jewish 
practices. There are often (but probably not only) humanitarian concerns and liberal 
ideas about the individual’s right to choose for him-/herself and concern for the well-
                                                        
12
 In most but not all countries left-wingers are actually somewhat more often than Muslim extremists perceived 
as the source of antisemitic comments, and both of these groups generally (with the exception of Hungary and 




being of animals involved in this critique of Jewish traditions. We use the term 
Aufklärungsantisemitismus to summarize this phenomenon. 
 
Figure 31 below shows the degree to which the three different antisemitisms are represented 
in the eight countries included in this study: 
 
Each of the three rather distinct antisemitisms we have discerned seems to be based on a 
particular and underlying “philosophy”. It appears that they are also carried by sociologically 
rather distinct types of persons/persecutors. The ways these different forms of antisemitisms 
are manifested publically also seem to differ significantly. It is probably not too farfetched to 
suppose that the psychological driving forces triggering manifestations of these diverging 
antisemitic positions also differ among their respective persecutors. 
 
Antisemitism and political exploitations of fear. 
What could explain why the Jews in the country with the lowest level of classic antisemitism 
in the population, Sweden, manifest the highest level of fear and avoidance behaviour when it 
comes to manifest one’s Jewish identity (cf. Figure 17 and Figure 18.)?  
Two factors appear to be in operation here: one is the fact that Swedish Jews are, as are 
most inhabitants in Sweden, rather indifferent to religious practices and symbols as such. It is 
not so important for most Jews in Sweden to openly manifest their often very strong Jewish 
identity by carrying religious symbols, since their Jewish identity can for the most part be 
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described as “ethno-cultural” rather than “religious”.
13
 With a very few individual exceptions, 
there are no openly orthodox Jews (in terms of dress-code, etc.) in Sweden. Sweden is a 
highly secularized country and symbols and manifestations of religious affiliation are not part 
of daily life in Sweden in any case.  
The other significant factor in this context is the fact that public critique of Israel is 
almost ubiquitous in Sweden. Those groups and persons who are prone to Israel-derived 
antisemitism might find a kind of tacit understanding – however misinterpreted! – or even 
legitimization of their attacks on Jews in that framework. At the very least, many Jews in 
Sweden may harbour that fear. In Sweden, not least in the city of Malmö, perpetrators of 
Israel-derived antisemitic attacks might have felt that they are somewhat understood, if not 
excused, by statements by the then leading political power-holder in the city (Ilmar Reepalu, 
representing the Social Democratic Party). In this connection, it should be noted that actions 
based on Israel-derived antisemitic sentiments tend to manifest themselves in violence and 
threats to a much greater extent than the other kinds of antisemitism. Consequently, since 
carrying things that flaunt one’s Jewish affiliation, or visiting a synagogue is not so important 
for most Jews in Sweden anyway, but doing so might trigger attacks based on hostility and 
anger towards Israel, it might be understandable that many Jews in Sweden tend to avoid 
manifesting their Jewishness in public – even if they, as we know from other studies,
14
 for the 
most part have a quite strong Jewish identity.  
The purpose of those who attack Jews in Europe based on their hatred for Israel is 
clearly to arouse fear in the Jewish community living in these countries and they actually 
seem to be succeeding. This is also the idea of ISIS (Daesh): one effect of their actions is the 
“destruction of the Grey Zone”, i. e. to create political polarization and disturb the fabric of 
civil life – in this case civil Jewish life.
 
One important point in this context is that even if violent attacks are not frequently 
experienced, the very fact that they have taken place – and that there is a constant threat that 
they may occur again! – is enough to trigger fear. This might be comparable to a pyromaniac 
operating in a residential area. Most inhabitants in the area, or even neighbouring areas, 
would feel justified in the fear that the pyromaniac would choose their house for his next 
attack – even if the likelihood that this would indeed happen is actually low. Nevertheless, 
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 Dencik, L. (2011). The Dialectics of Diaspora. On the Art of being Jewish in the Swedish Modernity, in J. 
Schoeps and O. Glöckner (eds.), A Road to Nowhere. Jewish Experience in Unifying Europe, pp. 121-150. 
Leiden/Boston: BRILL. 
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 Dencik, L. & Marosi, K. (2007). Judiskt Liv i Sverige – identitet, levnadsvanor och attityder bland 
medlemmarna i de judiska församlingarna i Sverige vid ingången till 2000-talet. Stockholm: Judiska 
Centralrådet i Sverige. 
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probably none of them would claim that the actions taken by the pyromaniac are only the “top 
of the iceberg” of an underlying “pyromanianism” in society. However, when it comes to 
Israel-derived antisemitic attacks on Jews, certain commentators tend to do so. Such attacks 
are often – rightly or wrongly – interpreted as the top of an iceberg indicating an underlying 
and widespread antisemitism in society.  
It should be observed that this is fully in line with the ambitions of the antisemitic 
perpetrators. It facilitates their exploitation of the attacks for their political purposes. 
However, there are also other political forces that have an interest in exploiting Israel-
derived antisemitic attacks, often instigated by certain Arab/Muslim groups (as they have 
proven often to be,) for their own political purposes. One such political force is the populist 
anti-Muslim camp in the society. For them it is easy and more than tempting to generalize 
from single cases and to make claims like: “Look! That’s how they are! We cannot have 
“these Muslims” around in our society!”  
Another political force also interested in generalizing and exploiting fear and 
antisemitic attacks for their particular political purpose, is the Zionist camp: “Look! That’s 
how it is there (in Sweden/ Europe). Antisemitism is ubiquitous in these societies. It has just 
manifested its ugly face again. Jews cannot live there.” (Implying: move to Israel, i.e. make 
aliyah!) 
Our question is: Is there really an “iceberg of antisemitism” underlying the violent 
antisemitic attacks that we can indeed observe? Or are we dealing with certain “pyromaniacs” 
creating fear among the inhabitants, plus certain, but seemingly opposed, political forces who 
are successfully exploiting such fears for their particular political interests?  
Either conclusion is in need of empirical evidence to back it up.  
 
Distinctions between the three antisemitisms. 
Classic antisemitism, i.e. antisemitism based on traditional antisemitic stereotypes about Jews 
is most frequent in the Hungarian population, where it is also by far the predominant form of 
antisemitism. Those who manifest this kind of antisemitism are mainly identified as political 
right-wingers. This kind of antisemitism is primarily manifested in derogatory verbal personal 
or public remarks and acts of social discrimination. 
As can be seen in Figure 31 this kind of antisemitism is present to a considerable degree 
also in the French population, but much less so in the UK and in particular Sweden. 
Israel-derived antisemitism, i.e. attacks on Jews emanating from hostility towards the 
State of Israel and/or anger due to actions taken by the Israeli state, is frequently observed by 
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Jews in Belgium, Italy, France, the UK and Sweden. Those who carry out such attacks are 
mainly identified as persons with Muslim extremist views and/or political left-wingers. This 
kind of antisemitism is relatively often demonstrated by acts of violence towards Jewish 
institutions, symbols and persons. 
This kind of antisemitism is much less present in the former communist East-European 
countries Hungary and Latvia, than in the West-European countries that have absorbed large 
numbers of Muslim immigrants in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
Aufklärungsantisemitismus, i.e. critique of core Jewish practices, and accusations 
against Jewish representatives and individuals because of it is very frequently heard in 
Sweden and Germany, and often, but not as intensely, in the UK and France. To some extent, 
this kind of critique might actually be a disguised attack on the numerically much more 
significant Muslim population in the country. Muslims and Jews share the tradition of 
circumcising their sons – albeit at quite different stages in the boys’ development and by 
slightly different techniques – and slaughtering animals according to similar religious 
prescriptions. Those who criticize these religiously based traditions are mostly persons who 
perceive themselves as “progressive”, liberal and left-wing oriented. The critique is usually 
presented as comments in the public debate and sometimes takes the shape of proposing legal 
prohibition of the Jewish practices in question. 
As can be seen in Figure 31, the three forms of antisemitism are present today in various 
degrees in the countries included in this study. In Belgium and France all three forms exist on 
a fairly high level, whereas in Sweden, Germany and the UK, the kind of anti-Jewish 
sentiments that dominate the picture, Aufklärungsantisemitismus, should perhaps not be 
counted as  proper antisemitism, even if it is of course clearly anti-Jewish. Many of those who 
advocate that position do not share the values and attitudes of those who manifest the two 
other kinds of antisemitism.  
There might of course be persons who share all three sets of antisemitic attitudes. The 
popular idea that it is “the same old antisemitism” that again and again pops-up and “shows 
its ugly face” does not, however, find support in our study. It is more likely that there are 
actually three distinct antisemitisms in play. Of course, a number of persons might at the same 
time, for example, hold classic antisemitic stereotypes, be hostile towards Israel and in favor 
of prohibiting core Jewish customs such as the manufacture of kosher meat products and 
circumcision. However our data do not suggest that there should be a significant correlation 
between them – rather that they are inspired by different underlying “philosophies”, carried 
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